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Studying Oil, Islam, and Women as if Political
Institutions Mattered

Alice Kang, University of Wisconsin, Madison
doi: JO. JOJ 7IS J741921X0999lB77

By asserting that oil, not Islam, hurts gender equality, Michael Ross (2008)
has made an important contribution to the debate on whether Islam bodes
ill for women (Fish 2002; Inglehart and Norris 2003; Spierings, Smits, and
Verloo 2009). Ross suggests that oil production decreases the number of
female workers in countries with occupational segregation. The more
women are left out of the formal economy, the fewer opportunities and
resources they have for becoming influential political constituencies.
According to Ross, "[t]his leaves oil-producing states with atypically
strong patriarchal cultures and political institutions" (p. 107). Employing
the same set of countries and data used in Ross (2008), I show that the
institution of gender quotas, which is omitted from his statistical
analyses, offsets the effects of oil rents on women's political
representation. Gender quotas increase women's representation in
Muslim majority and non-Muslim majority countries and in countries
that are oil rich and oil pOOL! That "petroleum perpetuates patriarchy"
(p. 120) is a tendency, not destiny.

I thank Michael Ross for sharing his data and for responding to my questions. I thank Mark
Copclovitch. Stephane Lavcrtu, Kathleen Klaus. Aili Mari Tripp. and participants at the
Comparative Rescarch Colloquium at the University of Wisconsin, Madison, for their comments.
l. I make a conscious decision to use the term "Muslim majority." In Muslim majority countries,
morc than 50% of the population identify as Muslim. In Islamic countries, Islam is adopted as the
state religion.

Copyright 2009 University of Chicago Press. Used by permission.
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The Role of Political Institutions
Ross recognizes that political institutions affect women's chances of taking
office. 2 His models include measures of democracy, proportionalrepresentation electoral system, closed party lists, and district magnitude.
To better capture the causal process by which women are elected, I
suggest two modifications.
First, include quotas in models of political representation inasmuch as
in-depth country and cross-national studies demonstrate that gender
quotas have become a "fast track" for women seeking public office since
1995 (Bhavnani 2009; Dahlerup and Freidenvall 2005; Htun and Jones
2002; Jones 1998; Paxton, Hughes, and Painter n.d.; Tripp and Kang
2008). As of 2008, more than 100 countries around the world use
voluntary political party and compulsory legal quotas. Out of 49
predominantly Muslim countries, 22 (44.9%) have adopted quotas. Of
64 countries that produced more than $100 in oil rents in a single year,
33 (51.6%) have adopted quotas (see Table 1). Ross's model appears to
obtain more accurate estimations by including quotas.
Second, consider how institutions and natural resources shape one
another to better understand the conditions under which resources
generate gendered effects. Political institutions may alter the incentive
structure that encourages rent-seeking behavior in resource-abundant
countries (Mehlum, Moene, and Torvik 2006; Robinson, Torvik, and
Verdier 2006). In the absence of a quota system, leaders may be more
likely to ignore the demands of the female electorate during an oil
boom. When quotas are in place, leaders may cater more to women's
demands even during an oil boom. In an authoritarian state, leaders may
disregard women's demands when oil is plentiful, whereas leaders in a
democratic state may seek out female voters by using oil revenues to
provide jobs, education, and health care. A similar hypothesis can be
made about the effects of electoral systems on the use of nahlral resources.

Data and Results
Replicating Ross's cross-sectional analysis, I examine whether political
institutions offset the impact of oil on women's political representation.
The dependent variable is Female Seats, the percentage of women in
2. In this essay, institutions are "rules and procedures (both formal and informal) that stTlicture social
interaction by constraining and enabling actors' behavior" (Helmkc and Levitsky 2004, 727),
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Table 1.

Gender quotas for lower house and unicameral seats in oil-rich
countries, 1960-2008 (years where oil rents exceeded S100 per capita)

With Quotas, Year the First Quota Was Adopted
Albania (1974-85)
2001
Hungary (1979-85)
Algeria (1967 -2006)
2002
Indonesia (1974-85, 2005)
Angola (1974-2006)
2005
Iraq (1960-2006)
Argentina (1974-2006)
1991
Israel (1971-75)
Australia (1973-2006)
1994
Lithuania (1974-81)
Austria (1979-81)
1986
Mexico (1974-2006)
Bolivia (1974-2006)
1997
Netherlands (l9n-2006)
Bosnia & Herzegovina (1985-95)
2001
Norway (1975-2006)
Brazil (2005-6)
1986
Peru (1979-85)
Cameroon (1979-90)
1996
Romania (1974-2006)
Canada (1960-2006)
1992
Sudan (2005)
Chile (1980-83)
1988
Tunisia (1974-85,1987,
1990, 2005)
Colombia (1974-2006)
1999
Ukraine (2006)
Croatia (1984-90)
2000
United Kingdom (1977-87,
1990-92, 1996, 2000-6)
Denmark (1985,1990,2000-6)
1985
Uzbekistan (1987-2006)
Ecuador (1973-2005)
1997
Venezuela (1960-2006)
Egypt (1977-87, 90, 2005-6)
1979
With No Quotas
Azerbaijan (1985-2006)
Bahrain (1960-2006)
Barbados (1984-85)
Brunei Darussalam (1960-2006)
Central African Republic (1994-200 I)
Chad (2004-5)
Congo, Republic (1973-2006)
Equatorial Guinea (1995 -2006)
Gabon (1965-2005)
Iran (1960-2006)
Kazakhstan (1985 - 2006)
Kuwait (1960-2006)
Libya (1962-2006)
Malaysia (1976-2006)
New Zealand (1980-2006)
Nigeria (1973-2006)

1999
2003
2004
1997
1996
1993
1987
1975
1997
2001
2005
2004
1992
1992
2004
1998

Oman (1964-2006)
Papua New Guinea (1993,1996)
Qatar (1960 - 2006)
Russia (1965- 2006)
Saudi Arabia (1960-2006)
Suriname (1999-2004)
Syria (1974-2006)
Tajikistan (1974-2001)
Thailand (2006)
Trinidad and Tobago (1960-2006)
Turkmenistan (1978-2006)
United Arab Emirates (1968-2006)
United States (1960-2006)
Vietnam (1971-85)
Yemen (1989-91,1994-97,1999-2006)

Note: Several countries dropped their quotas (c.g., Colombia, Egypt). Years of quota adoption arc from
International IDEA (2009), Dahlerup (2006), and Krook (2009). Oil rent years arc from Ross's
longitudinal data set.

lower house and unicameral parliaments in 2002 or the most recent year
for which the data are available. Ross's key independent variable is Oil
Rents, the value of oil and gas production minus the extraction costs
divided by the midyear population. Oil Rents and other economic
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variables are measured in constant 2000 dollars. I add Quotas, a
dichotomous variable of whether voluntary party quotas or any legally
mandated quotas were in effect for the election reported in Ross's data
set. Information on quotas is compiled from the Global Database of
Quotas for Women, Dahlerup (2006), and Krook (2009).
The percentage of women in parliament averages 15.7% in oil-poor
countries, in contrast to 12.4% in oil-rich countries (Table 2, replicating
Ross's Table 3). I further disaggregate the sample by Quotas. Oil-rich
countries with quotas have on average slightly higher rates of female
representation than oil-poor countries with quotas, unless the sample is
limited to countries not in the Organization for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD). The descriptive statistics support Ross's idea
that oil's impact in developing countries differs from that of OECD
countries. Oil-producing countries seem less friendly to women given
that 27.0% of oil-rich countries, while half of oil-poor countries have
quotas. Nevertheless, the descriptive statistics indicate that quotas should
be included in models predicting rates of women's representation.
Table 3 reestimates Ross's ordinary least squares (OLS) models (see his
Table 4). The presence of quotas is positively and significantly correlated
with women's representation when controlling for oil rents, female labor
force participation (model 6) and political institutions like democracy
and electoral system (model 7). The findings are robust to various model
specifications (including region dummies, excluding the two most
influential cases) with the exception of a model that includes a control
variable for closed lists electoral systems, which had a smaller sample of
Table 2.

Parliamentary seats held by women, 2002 (percentage)

Oil Rich
No Quota
(n = 27)
Muslim
majority
Non-Muslim
majority
Non-Mu;lim
majority
(nol1- .

Oil

All

Quota
(n

= 10)

(n

= 37)

No Quota
(n = 63)

POOT

All

Quota
(n

= 63)

(n

= 126)

4.1

13.5

5.8

8.5

12.9

10.6

15.4

21.5

17.4

13.5

19.8

16.6

12.3

16.1

13.1

n.o

17.3

15.0

10.0

19.1

12.4

12.7

18.8

15.7

OECD)

All

Note: Oil-rich countries generate at least $100 per capita in oil rents.
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Table 3.

Cross-sectional OLS regressions on female seats in parliament

Income (log)
Middle East
Islam
Oil rents

Ross Model 4
(1)

Modified 4
(2)

Ross Model 5
(3)

Modified 5
(4)

Ross Model 7
(5)

Modified 7
(6)

Interaction
Tenn (7)

0.320* **
(3.41)
-0.193*
(2.42)
-0.1"39
(I. 56)
-0.21S*·*
(3.32)

0.276**
(2.9S)
-O.ISS**
(2.72)
-0.132
(1.63 )
-0.167**
(2.S6)

0.329* .*
(3.74)
-O.OS
(0.S4)
-0.103
( 1.17)
-0.152*
(2.16)

0.2S4*·'
(3.27)
-0.065
(0.77)
-0.095
(1.22 )
-0.104
(1.65)

0.367* **
(4.13)
-0.253·* *
(3.2S)
-0.144
(1.50)
-O.23S***
(3.46)
-0.29S**
(2.94)
0.316**'

0.351**·
(4.06)
-0.25S*·*
(3.74)
-0.156
(LSI)
-0.207**
(3.21)
-0.322**
(3.IS)
0.265***

0.311 *.*
(3.73)
-0.267**
(5.15)

0.309***
(3.6S)

0.314***
(3.95)
0.263* **
(3.77)

Polity
Proportional
representation

(4.30)
Female LFP
Quotas

0.261***
(3.5S)

(3.S6)
O.23S*·*
(3.49)

Oil'Quotas
Observations
R-squared

161
0.26

161
0.33

160
0.33

160
0.39

161
0.35

-0.014
(0.04)

161
0.40

a
c:
0.300* *
(2.S6)
0.192
(0.50)
161
0.32

Notes: Dependent variable is parliamentary seats held by women (%). 2002. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All variables are standardized .• Significant at 5%;

'*signifieant at 1%; ·"significant at 0.1%.
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88 countries. In a reduced-form simulation using Clarify 2.0, where the
value of income is set at the mean and the country is not in the Middle
East, the percentage of women in parliament in the absence of oil and
absence of quotas is 14%. If quotas are introduced, the percentage
increases to 19.1 % (an increase of 36%). If there are no quotas and the
amount of oil rents is $1,280 (about a one standard deviation rise from
0), the percentage of women in parliament decreases from 14% to 12.1 %.
To assess whether institutions mitigate the impact of oil, I include an
interaction term (Oil Rents x Quotas) in a baseline model that includes
controls for income and the Middle East region (model 7). The standard
results table, however, does not provide much useful information when
using multiplicative interaction models. In particular, the insignificance
of the interaction term does not imply the absence of meaningful
intervening effects (Brambor, Clark, and Golder 2006, p. 74). To assess
whether the marginal effect of oil rents differs between quota and nonquota-holding countries, it is necessary to go an extra step. Figure 1

o

Quotas

FIGURE I.
Coefficients relating oil rents to women's political representation, at
different levels of quotas (hase model). (Figure assembled with coding from

Braumoeller 2004,)
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illustrates how the coefficients and confidence intervals on oil rents vary
across different levels of quotas. In the absence of quotas, the effect of oil
rents on women's representation is significantly negative, supporting
Ross's claim that oil reduces women's representation. In the presence of
quotas, the effect of oil rents on women's representation is not
statistically significant as zero falls within the 95% confidence interval,
which calls for further investigation into the role of institutions.

Conclusion

In this essay, I have argued that scholars should also consider how political
institutions affect the resource curse on women. Four pressing questions
emerge:
I. What is the effect of oil on women's mobilization and movement success?
Does oil production make it more difficult for women in parliament to
influence politics?
2. What are the causal mechanisms by which political institutions mitigate the
perverse effects of oil? Do institutions alter the economic aspects of the
gendered resource curse (i.e., Dutch disease) or do institutions lessen the
resource curse by changing the incentives that rent-seeking leaders face?
3. To what extent are institutions endogenous to natural resources? Why do
some oil-producing countries adopt gender quotas while others do not?
Quota adoption may not be endogenous to previous levels of female
representation (Paxton, Hughes, and Painter, n.d.). Yet Table 2 indicates
that quotas may be endogenous to oil production.
4. Do institutions also constrain the ways in which religion influences political
outcomes for women? This replication corroborates Ross's claim that Islam,
measured by the proportion of the population that are Muslim, does not
correlate with lower rates of women's representation. Nuanced analyses
suggest that the distribution of resources influences the strength of
organized religion (Blofield 2006), as cloes the relationship between state
and societal leaders (Charrad 200 I; Htun 2003).

Ross's study will inspire scholars to pay more attention to the gendered
dimensions of the resource curse. This essay finds, however, that gender
quotas may offset the negative effect of oil rents on the presence of
women in national parliaments. The widespread adoption of gender
quotas has increased women's parliamentary representation in Muslim
majority and non-Muslim majority countries and in oil-rich and oil-poor
countries. Our understanding of the factors that help improve women's
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lives will grow, so long as we consider how political institutions mitigate or exacerbate - the pernicious effect of natural resources on women.
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Comparative Political Economy, Gender,
and Labor Markets
Teri L. Caraway, University of Minnesota
do;: 1o. J 017/S 174N23X09990,S9

The publication in 2008 of Michael Ross's "Oil, Islam, and Women" by
the discipline's flagship journal, the American Political Science Review, is
a welcome development. It is the first empirical work with a primary
focus on gender and political economy ever published in the journal
and portends well for the development of research that focuses on such
questions. My essay has two foci. The first is a critical engagement with
Ross's analysis of why oil production negatively affects women's
employment prospects. The second is how to further develop the study
of gender in the comparative political economy of labor markets.

Oil and Women's Employment
Ross's argument about the effect of oil on women's employment hinges on
how Dutch disease interacts with gender segregation in labor markets to
produce low female labor-force participation rates. One of the important
effects of Dutch disease is a decline in the traded goods sector and an
expansion in the nontraded goods sector. Ross asserts that because
women workers are concentrated in the tradable sector and male workers
in the nontradable sector, Dutch disease has gendered effects on
employment. Since demand for women's labor falls - as a consequence
of the contraction of the tradable sector - so do women's wages.
Women are thus more reluctant to enter the labor market. In the
nontradable sector, which is dominated by male workers, wages increase
as a result of the higher demand for their labor. The increase in male
wages also affects women's "reservation wage" - the wage that women
must be paid to make it worthwhile to enter the workforce. If men earn
high wages, then women are reluctant to enter the workforce. Women
will only work if they have the potential to earn substantial wages, but
since they are concentrated in the contracting tradable sector, such

